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BONGIOVANNI v. COMMISSIONER:
FALSE HOPES FOR CASH BASIS TAXPAYERS
INTRODUCTION
Cash basis taxpayers attempting a tax-free incorporation of a
sole proprietorship or a partnership under Section 351 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code1 have had to be extremely cautious to avoid
the pitfall created by Section 357 (c).2 Basically, 357 (c) provides
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 351.
This section provides generally:(a) General Rule.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if property
is transferred to a corporation . . . by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corpora-
tion and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control (as defined in section 358(c)) of the
corporation.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 357 (c).
Section 357 (Assumption of liability) provides in relevant parts:
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in subsections (b) and(c), if
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be permit-
ted to be received under section 351 . . . without the recog-
nition of gain if it were the sole consideration, and
(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the ex-
change assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or acquires from
the taxpayer property subject to a liability,
then such assumption or acquisition shall not be treated as money
or other property, and shall not prevent the exchange from being
within the provisions of section 351....
(b) Tax Avoidance Purpose.-(1) In General.If taking into consideration the nature of
the liability and the circumstances in the light of which the
arrangement for the assumption or acquisition was made, it
appears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with re-
spect to the assumption or acquisition described in subsec-
tion (a)-
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the
exchange, or
(B) if not such a purpose, was not a bona fide business
purpose, then such assumption or acquisition ... shall, for
purposes of section 351 ... be considered as money re-
ceived by the taxpayer on the exchange.
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.-
(1) In General.-In the case of an exchange-
(A) to which section 351 applies,...
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed plus the
amount of liabilities to which the property is subject, ex-
ceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property trans-
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that the taxpayer, when transferring property to a corporation in
what would otherwise be a tax-free Section 351 exchange, must
recognize income to the extent his transferred liabilities exceed
the adjusted basis of his transferred assets. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner8 ap-
plied a novel interpretation of Section 357 which, to a certain ex-
tent, has worked to abolish this pitfall. "Liabilities" as referred
to in Section 357 was construed not to include such liabilities as
trade accounts payable. This holding, if followed, is a major vic-
tory for cash basis taxpayers in that it would remove one of the
more serious obstacles to tax-free incorporation. Because the
case stands alone in its reasoning, however, tax advisors should
view its advantages with cautious optimism. Supreme Court re-
view seems imminent due to the fact that Bongiovanni is in direct
opposition to Tax Court precedents4 and a similar case decided by
the Seventh Circuit. 5
BoNGiovxmqi
John Bongiovanni operated a masonry contracting business as a
sole proprietorship. He was a cash basis taxpayer, reporting income
only when collected and deducting expenses only when actually
paid. In April of 1965, Bongiovanni transferred all the assets and
liabilities of his sole proprietorship to the Keystone Masonry
Corporation in return for all of the stock issued by the corporation
which was valued at $26,000, together with the corporation's note
for $51,253, payable on demand.6
The figures7 on page 859 reflect both the fair market value and
Bongiovanni's adjusted basis in the assets transferred, as well as the
liabilities assumed by the corporation.
The Commissioner determined that Section 357(c) required Bon-
giovanni to be taxed on the difference between his liabilities,
ferred pursuant to such an exchange, then such excess
shall be considered as a gain from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset or of property which is not a capital asset, as
the case may be.(2) Exceptions.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any ex-
change to which-(A) subsection (b) (1) of this section applies.
3. Bongiovanni v. Comm'r, 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972) rev'g P-H TAX CT.
REP. & MEm. DEC. 71-262.
4. See Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966); N.F. Testor, 40 T.C. 273
(1963), affd, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964); Arthur Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553
(1962).
5. Testor v. Comm'r, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964), affg 40 T.C. 273
(1963).
6. 470 F.2d at 922.
7. Id.
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Amount or
Fair Market Bongiovanni'sItem Value Basis
Cash $ 223 $ 223Trade Receivables 57,741 
-0-Office equipment 1,160 1,160Work-in-process 22,762 
-0-Raw materials 8,029 
-0-Tools and supplies 4,575 
-0-
$94,490 $ 1,383Less: payables 17,237 
-0-
$77,253 $ 1,383
$17,237, and the adjusted basis of his assets, $1,383-a total differ-
ence of $15,854.8 The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner's posi-
tion0 in a memorandum which the court of appeals stated missed
the main issue.'0 The Tax Court, relying on its opinion in Peter
Raich," concluded that the solution came squarely within the
scope of Sections 351 and 357(c). The case was appealed by Bon-
giovanni, and he found a sympathetic forum at the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Lacking a formal error upon which to reverse, the
court merely pointed out the hardship suffered by cash basis tax-
payers and reasoned that this inequity could not be allowed to
stand, adverse statutory language and case law notwithstanding.
The court referred generally to the legislative history of Section
357(c) to support its premise that the use of the word "liability" in
Section 357(c) was not used in the sense of trade account pay-
able, which was a mere "accounting liability," but rather in the
sense of a lien on property, i.e., a "tax liability."'12
Any other construction results in an absurdity in the case of a
cash basis taxpayer whose trade accounts payable are not recog-
nized as a deduction (because he is on the cash basis) but whose
"liabilities" (although unpaid) are recognized for purposes of Sec-
tion 357(c).13
Finding no justification for such harsh discrinination against
cash basis taxpayers, the court refused to follow the previous
cases 14 and instead held that Bongiovanni had no "liabilities" in the
8. Id.
9. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 71-262.
10. 470 F.2d at 923.
11. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
12. 470 F.2d at 924.
13. Id.
tax sense and therefore recognized no taxable gain. The plain lan-
guage of the Code was stretched by the court in order to arrive at
what it considered the only just result. This is a step the Tax Court
refused to take in Peter Raich15 although it recognized the unfair-
ness of the literal interpretation of the Code in noting:
[W] e are not unmindful that the result reached may conflict with
the well established intent of Congress to foster tax-free reorgani-
zations.16
The Second Circuit, however, had no problem in ensuring that
a "just" result occurred. Determined not to frustrate the "well
established intent" of Congress, it cited the Supreme Court"1 say-
ing:
When... [plain] meaning has led to absurd or futile results..
this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.
Frequently... even when the plain meaning did not produce ab-
surd results but merely an unreasonable one "plainly at variance
with the policy of the legislation taken as a whole" this Court has
followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.' 8
CASH BASIS V. ACCRUAL BASIS
Section 357(c) has vastly different tax consequences for the
cash basis taxpayer as opposed to an accrual basis taxpayer. Both
methods of accounting are authorized by the Code,' 9 but once
adopted, the taxpayer may not change his method without the
consent of the Secretary or his delegate.2 0 Under the cash receipts
and disbursements method of accounting, income is not reported
until cash or items which can be valued in terms of money are
received or constructively received and similarly, expenses are
not deducted for tax purposes when they are incurred, but rather
when they are actually paid. Under this method, accounts receiv-
able, not having been reported as income, have an adjusted basis
of zero in the hands of the taxpayer because he has incurred no
tax liability for them. Conversely, trade accounts payable are
valued in full because they have not yet been deducted as an ex-
pense by the taxpayer, i.e., he has received no "tax benefit" from
them. There are therefore two aspects which must be considered
when dealing with receivables and payables-their actual fair
market value and their adjusted basis or "tax value". Suppose
14. See notes 4 and 5, supra.
15. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
16. Id. at 611.
17. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
18. 470 F.2d at 924 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns,
Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (footnote omitted).
19. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 446 (c).
20. Id. § 446(e).
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A's business had accounts receivable of $50,000, property with an
adjusted basis $10,000 and a fair market value of $30,000, and ac-
counts payable of $15,000. Looking at the balance sheet from the as-
pect of fair market value, there are assets of $80,000 (accounts re-
ceivable plus the fair market value of the property) and liabilities
of $15,000 or a net worth of $65,000.
Looked at from a tax aspect, the same business has assets valued
at $10,000 (the adjusted basis of the property) and liabilities of
$15,000 for a net worth of minus $5,000. A taxpayer who utilizes
this method of accounting acquires a "basis" in his receivables
equal to the amount of income recognized. As he collects the re-
ceivables, he recognizes no income unless he collects an amount in
excess of his basis. Similarly, once liabilities are incurred and de-
ducted, the taxpayer has received a "benefit" and will realize in-
come on an exchange in which his liabilities are assumed or can-
eled.
Section 357(c) of the Code21 operates in a fair and consistent
manner in the instance of the accrual basis taxpayer and seems to
have been written with him in mind.22 If, pursuant to a Section
35123 exchange an accrual basis taxpayer transfers assets which
have a greater basis than the amount of liabilities assumed by the
corporation, he will recognize no gain. The amount of liabilities
assumed by the corporation is treated as if the corporation had
paid the transferor cash in addition to the stock issued to him. The
taxpayer's basis in the stock he receives is reduced by the amount
of the liabilities assumed.24 Thus, if the taxpayer transferred as-
sets with a fair market value of $40,000 and an adjusted basis of
$20,000 and liabilities of $20,000 in return for stock with a fair
market value of $20,000, the taxpayer's basis in the stock would be
zero, i.e., his basis in the property transferred less the amount of
the liabilities assumed. 5 When the taxpayer disposes of the stock,
21. See note 2, supra, for this section's relevant provisions.
22. Both the House and Senate Reports dealing with Section 357 (c) as
well as the Regulations fail to address themselves to the peculiar problem
of cash basis taxpayers. All hypotheticals given to illustrate the section's
effect deal only with mortgaged property and do not touch on accounts
receivable or payables. See 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4064, 4267-69,
4908 (1954).
23. See note 1, supra, for the relevant provisions of Section 351.
24. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 358(a), (d).
25. Id.
he will have $20,000 which he must recognize as income. The pur-
pose of Section 351 is accomplished by postponing the recognition of
the income. The economic status quo has been maintained in that
had the taxpayer been paid $40,000 by the corporation in return for
his assets, he would recognize $20,000 on the sale and would have
$20,000 left after liquidating his liabilities. He would receive no
deduction when he paid his liabilities because as an accrual basis
taxpayer he had already deducted them when they were incurred.
The taxpayer is free to decide whether or not to incorporate with-
out regard to the immediate tax consequences of income recog-
nition.
Section 357(c) becomes operative when the corporate transferee
assumes more liabilities than the taxpayer's basis in the trans-
ferred assets. The taxpayer is required to recognize income on the
difference between the two. Assume that the accrual taxpayer
transfers assets with a fair market value of $40,000 and an adjusted
basis of $5,000 and liabilities of $20,000 in return for stock with a
fair market value of $20,000. Section 357(c) would require the tax-
payer to recognize $15,000 of income, the amount by which his lia-
bilities exceeded the adjusted basis of the transferred assets. The
basis of the taxpayer's stock would be the basis of the property
transferred ($5,000) less the liability assumed ($20,000) plus the
gain recognized on the transfer ($15,000), a total of zero. The tax-
payer's position is still the same as if he had sold the property for
$40,000, realizing a gain of $35,000 over his basis. He would have
$20,000 left after liquidating his liabilities. The only difference is
that he would recognize the whole $35,000 gain at once. By trans-
ferring the assets and liabilities to the corporation subject to Sec-
tion 351, he recognizes income only to the extent required by Sec-
tion 357(c) ($15,000) and postpones recognition of the remaining
$20,000 of income until he sells the stock which has a basis of zero
in his hands.
A cash basis taxpayer, on the other hand, does not fit so neatly
into the statutory scheme, especially when considering assets
such as accounts receivable. Because the taxpayer has never rec-
ognized the receivables as income, his basis is zero. Suppose that
the taxpayer transfers accounts receivable of $70,000 with a basis
of zero and accounts payable of $15,000 for stock with a fair mar-
ket value of $55,000. Section 357(c) demands that income of $15,-
000 be recognized. The taxpayer's basis in the stock received
would be his basis in the assets transferred (zero) less the amount
of liabilities assumed by the corporation ($15,000) plus the gain
recognized on the exchange ($15,000), a total of zero. When he sells
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the stock, he will recognize $55,000, making a total of $70,000 of in-
come recognized. He has, however, lost the $15,000 deduction he
would have enjoyed had he liquidated his own liabilities. The
Bongiovanni court points out that "[i] t is no answer to say that the
taxpayer's wholly-owned corporation will eventually reap a bene-
fit which will redound to appellant. The corporate taxpayer
would be entitled to its deduction whether or not the cash basis in-
dividual taxpayer had been taxed under Section 357 (c). See Treas.
Reg. § 1.146-1 (a) (2).1"26 It is not clear why the court makes this
statement. It seems more likely that the corporate transferee would
not receive a deduction, either when assuming the liabilities or
when paying them, because such expenditures are not to be con-
sidered expenses incurred in the production of income.2 7
Section 357
The Bongiovanni court, dealing with facts similar to the previous
example, states that "Congress certainly could not have intended
such an inequitable result, especially in light of its expressed pur-
poses in enacting Sections 351 and 357(c). ' '28 The legislative his-
tory of Section 357(c) is not enlightening however. Section (b) 29
was apparently added to prevent a transferor from mortgaging
property just prior to transfer and then having the transferee ac-
cept the property and assume the mortgage.30  This would, in ef-
fect, give the taxpayer boot in the form of cash which he would
not have to recognize under Section 351. Sub-section (c) is aimed
at covering all situations where it does not appear the taxpayer's
purpose was tax avoidance, but nevertheless, the transferee as-
sumed more liabilities than the transferor's adjusted basis in the
transferred assets. The House Report says:
[I] f. . . the liabilities assumed, or the liabilities to which the prop-
erty is subject, exceed the total of the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty transferred . . ., such excess shall be considered as gain from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset. Thus, if an individual trans-
fers, under section 351, property having a basis in his hands of
$20,000 but subject to a mortgage of $50,000, to a corporation con-
26. 470 F.2d at 925.
27. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
28. 470 F.2d at 925.
29. See note 2, supra, for relevant provisions of this subsection.
30. See Burke & Chisholm, Section 357, A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free
Incorporations, 25 TAx L. REv. 211 (1970).
trolled by him, such individual will be subject to tax at rates ap-
plicable to the sale of capital assets with respect to $30,000, the ex-
cess of the amount of the liability over the adjusted basis of the
property in the hands of the transferor.31
The Senate Report is much the same8 2 as the House Report and
used the same hypothetical situation involving a mortgage to illus-
trate the Section's impact. Neither makes a distinction between
cash and accrual basis transferors, nor do the Regulations. 3
At this point, a look at the development of the law which culmi-
nated in the enactment of Section 357 may aid in framing the prob-
lem. Prior to the 1939 Code,8 4 the Commissioner took the position
that assumption of liabilities by a corporate transferor was to be
treated as if the transferee had received cash from the transferor
in the amount of the liabilities assumed. This was to be taxable
income to the transferor. The Commissioner's position was con-
firmed by the Supreme Court in 1938 in United States v. Hendler"8
which held that the Hendler Co. must recognize $534,297.40, the
amount of its debt assumed by the Borden Co., in an otherwise tax-
free transaction.
The transaction . . . is to be regarded as though $534,297.40 had
been paid directly to the Hendler Company. Its gain was as real
and substantial as if the money had been paid it and then paid over
by it to its creditors. The discharge of liability by the payment of
Hendler Company's indebtedness constituted income to the Hendler
Company and is to be treated as such.80
This holding, in effect, brought the Hendler Co. within the provi-
sions of Section 112 of the 1928 Code83 which provided for recogni-
tion of income when "other property" or boot was received in addi-
tion to stock in the transferee corporation.
This was the first time that this interpretation was upheld and
the Commissioner's victory proved to be a hollow one. If income
was to be recognized by the transferor on such exchanges, then the
transferee's basis in the property received would be increased
by the amount of income so recognized. The Commissioner was
faced with a tremendous loss of revenue if all former transferees
in such exchanges could successfully claim a stepped up basis on
the premise that the transferors should have recognized income
when their liabilities were assumed. 8
31. 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4267 (1954).
32. Id. at 4908.
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (1960).
34. T. Rsv. CODE OF 1939.
35. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
36. Id. at 566.
37. INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1928, § 112.
38. See Burke & Chisholm, supra note 30, at 213.
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Because the Hendler decision seriously hampered tax-free trans-
actions, Congress overruled it by Section 112(k) of the 1939 Code.39
Section 112(k), the forerunner of Section 357 of the 1954 Code,40
provided that liabilities assumed by a corporation were not boot
unless it appeared that the transferor had a tax avoidance mo-
tive or that there was no legitimate business purpose for the as-
sumption of the liabilitiy.
In addition to incorporating Section 112(k) into the 1954 Code in
the form of Section 357(a) and (b), Congress saw fit to add Section
357(c) as well. This appears to be a significant point which the
Second Circuit overlooked in Bongiovanni. If, as the Court implied,
Congress' apparent purpose in enacting Section 357(c) was to pre-
vent tax avoidance,41 then Section 357(b) and (c) are synono-
mous. It is more reasonable to assume that Congress was not de-
liberately enacting a redundancy and that they intended sub-sec-
tion (c) to mean what it said. If tax avoidance is the motive for the
transaction, 357 (b) applies; if not, then 357 (c) is applicable. 42
Section 357(c) was tested in the courts and given a literal in-
terpretation.43 The only appellate level court to deal with its ef-
fect on cash basis taxpayers, prior to Bongiovanni, was the Seventh
Circuit in the case of Testor v. Commissioner." The section was
literally interpreted in that case as well and the petitioner was
forced to recognize income. Testor may be distinguished from
Bongiovanni in that the taxpayer's liabilities exceeded not only the
adjusted basis of his assets, but also their fair market value which
equalled their basis. The case remains strong authority for the
Commissioner's position, however.
A later Tax Court case, Peter Raich,4 5 is factually identical to
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 112(k).
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 357; see note 2, supra.
41. 470 F.2d at 924. The court says, "[Alpparently the purpose of that
section (357(c)) was to prevent a taxpayer's acquiring a permanently
tax-free gain by mortgaging certain of his property for an amount in ex-
cess of basis and then transferring property and mortgage under Section
351. In the present situation there is no such tax avoidance purpose .... "
42. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 357 (C) (2) (a); Section 357, A Hidden
Trap In Tax-Free Incorporations, supra note 30.
43. See Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966); N.F. Testor, 40 T.C. 273 (1963),
aff'd, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964); Arthur Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962).
44. Testor v. Comm'r, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
45. Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
the Bongiovanni case and once again the Commissioner prevailed
although the court expressed its own reservations about the fair-
ness of the results. 46
The taxpayer in Raich argued first that Congress intended Sec-
tion 357(c) to operate only when liabilities exceeded both the ad-
justed basis of the assets, as well as their fair market value. The
Court had little trouble rejecting this argument which had little sup-
port.47 Secondly, the taxpayer argued that for purposes of Sec-
tion 357(c), accounts receivable should have a basis at least equal
to liabilities transferred.48 Perhaps this would solve the inequities
toward the cash basis taxpayer, but once again the taxpayer had
no support for his position.
In finding for the Commissioner, the court in Raich refused to
disturb the "obvious meaning" of 357(c) and held that Section to
be both clear and unambiguous.49
The Service was quick to adopt Raich as its guideline. It issued
a Revenue Ruling5° stating that that holding would be applied
to situations involving similar facts "inasmuch as such section lit-
erally applies and the legislative history clearly supports the appli-
cation of that section under such circumstances." 51
The results of Raich have been criticized on the grounds that it
was incongruous "for the court to value receivables at zero and
payables at face. Either both might be valued at market or both
might be valued at zero, but to combine the two results makes nei-
ther tax nor accounting good sense. '52 While it may or may not
have been incongruous for the court to use this "double standard"
in Raich, there was no concrete basis on which to justify a differ-
ent result. The Code and the cases left the court no avenue of es-
cape.
One commentator, in criticizing the result of Raich, but neverthe-
less agreeing that the court had no choice, states:
Analysis of the statute will not yield a different result without
substantial twisting of the statutory language, and it seems un-
likely therefore that a court will be persuaded to upset the I.R.S.'s
present position. Obviously, where cash basis taxpayers are
concerned, payables should be handled with great care.0 3
46. See text accompanying note 16, supra.
47. 46 T.C. at 611.
48. Id. at 608-09.
49. Id. at 611.
50. Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969 Cum. BuLL. 53.
51. Id.
52. Note, Section 357(c) And The Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 1154, 1166 (1967).
53. White, Sleepers That Travel with Section 351 Transfers, 56 VA. L.
REv. 37, 42 (1970).
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Another suggests that in the absence of corrective legislation,
Raich could have avoided his problem by retaining sufficient re-
ceivables to liquidate his liabilities, transferring only his net as-
sets (based on book value) to the corporation."
Various attempts at circumventing the results of Section 357(c)
have failed" and the Raich case had appeared to close the lid on
the controversy until Bongiovanni was decided.
EcoNomc REArI Es?
The decision of the Circuit Court in Bongiovanni can be charac-
terized as one in which the court chose to look at the economic re-
alities of the facts rather than limiting itself to the narrow view
required by the Code. This willingness to elevate substance over
form may have been influenced in part by the Supreme Court ruling
in Nash v. United States5 6 in which the Court followed much the
same route in settling a split of the Circuit Courts over the problem
of whether to recognize income on the Section 351 transfer of ac-
counts receivable by a taxpayer using a reserve method of account-
ing. Such an accounting method recognizes that a portion of the
receivables will be non-collectible and the taxpayer is allowed a
present deduction for that portion of the receivables which are rea-
sonably predicted to be non-collectible, rather than forcing him to
wait until they become bad debts.57
In 1967 the Commissioner revealed that when a taxpayer who had
a cash reserve for bad debt transferred his accounts receivable, he
"recovered" his bad debt reserve, and because he had already re-
ceived a tax benefit by deducting the reserve, he must now recog-
nize it as income. 58
The Revenue Ruling was criticized5 9 but the Tax Court relied on
54. See Burke & Chisholm, supra note 30, at 230.
55. See Velma W. Alderman, 55 T.C. 662 (1971). (Taxpayer who trans-
ferred liabilities in excess of assets gave promissory note in amount of
difference. Basis of note held to be zero, therefore difference remained.);
Rev. Rul. 68-692, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 154; John Bongiovanni, P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 1971-262. (Taxpayer who attempted to switch from cash basis to
accrual basis prior to transfer was denied approval).
56. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970) rev'g 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.
1969).
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 166(a), c).
58. Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 Cum. BuLL,. 139.
59. See Arent, Reallocation of Income and Expenses in Connection with
it to decide Estate of Schmidt.60 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
this decision was reversed 6' as the court chose to look at "economic
realities."
Before the transfer of the business, the taxpayer owned all of its
assets and was obligated to pay all of its liabilities. He was per-
mitted to estimate in advance and charge against income accrued
the losses that would be sustained in collecting the accounts receiv-
able instead of waiting until an actual loss was incurred and
charging it off as a bad debt. It is conceded that the reserve was
reasonable. This means in economic terms that the value of the
accounts receivable was not their face amount, but that amount
less the reserve.62
The Commissioner's argument that because the taxpayer received
stock of less than the face value of the receivables he incurred a
loss (in the amount of the reserve), but that this loss was not rec-
ognized under Section 351, failed to sway the court which said, "We
are not impressed. We think... no income is received unless the
consideration received exceeds the net amount of the receiv-
ables."63
The Tax Court, however, chose not to follow the Ninth Circuit's
view in deciding cases in other circuits.64 When the Fifth Circuit
upheld the Commissioner65 and rejected the Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing in Estate of Schmidt, the controversy went to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision in NashO1
and followed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning as its own. The Court
took a practical look at the nature of a reserve for bad debt.
As stated in Geyer, Cornell, Newell, Inc. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 96, 1o0:
"A reserve consists of entries upon books of account. It is neither
Formation and Liquidation of Corporations, 40 TAxEs 995, 998 (1962).
The net effect of the ruling is to shift the deduction representing
the risk of noncollection from the transferor to the corporation
even though it is the transferor who pays the tax on the accrued
income. The corporation can collect the accounts tax free since it
acquired a substituted basis in the accounts equal to their face
amount. Thus, Rev. Rul. 62-128 results in allocating to one entity
an item of income and to another entity a direct expense of earn-
ing that income-a distortion of net income contrary to the pur-
pose of the reserve method of accounting for bad debts. (footnote
omitted)'.
60. Estate of Schmidt, 42 T.C. 1130 (1964) rev'd, 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir.
1966).
61. 355 F.2d Ill (9th Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 113.
63. Id. at 114.
64. See Max Schuster, 50 T.C. 99 (1968).
65. Nash v. United States, 41 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969) rev'g Birmingham
Trust Nat'l Bank v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 5202 (N.D. Ala.
1968).
66. 398 U.S. 1 (1970), rev'g 414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969).
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an asset nor a liability. It has no existence except upon the books,
and, unlike an asset or a liability, it cannot be transferred to any
other entity." 67
It decided that "[d] eduction of the reserve from the face amount
of the receivables transferred conforms to the reality of the trans-
action as the risk of non-collection was on the transferee."6 s
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit in Bongiovanni chose, as did the Supreme
Court in Nash, to look at the economic realities to arrive at a "just"
result. In so doing, it may have overstepped its authority in at-
tempting to alleviate an inequity which is imposed by a statute
which, until now, has been consistently upheld by the courts. Be-
cause the Commissioner has taken a firm position on the issue, the
only solution seems to lie in a legislative change to Section 357(c)
with regard to cash basis taxpayers. Congress might permit, for
purposes of that section only, accounts receivable to be valued at
their face.69 Another solution which has been suggested is that
cash basis taxpayers be required to accrue payables and receivables
upon transfer to a corporation.70 This proposal would correct the
result of Raich in cases where payables exceed receivables, but
would force the cash basis taxpayer to recognize income if the re-
verse were true-a result contra to the purpose of Section 351.
A plausible solution that might alleviate the inequity and be
simply applied is to consider the payables of a cash basis tax-
payer only in instances where 1) the taxpayer has increased his
basis in an asset by incurring the payables, or 2) the taxpayer has
received cash, e.g., by mortgaging his property, or 3) the taxpayer
has received a tax benefit from the payables, i.e., a deduction. This
test is the same one that would be applied in determining whether
the cancellation of debt has produced income.
Whatever course is followed, it is clear that the present Section
357(c) is discriminatory and defeats the purpose of Section 351 for
certain cash basis taxpayers. Until such time as Congress acts,
67. Id. at 4, n.4.
68. Id. at 4.
69. See Note, supra note 52, at 1166.
70. See Burke & Chisholm, supra note 30.
however, the problem will continue to exist. It is unlikely that
the Commissioner will acquiese in Bongiovanni or that he will fol-
low its holding in the future. Nor is it likely that the Supreme
Court will be able to find a legal foundation for sustaining the
"judicial legislation" enunciated by the Bongiovanni decision.
R. DENiN LUDERER
